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Abstract 
Affordable housing with fair and transparent land-allocation measures is a challenge for many countries. The Sultan-
ate of Oman solves this issue by means of land-allocation lotteries in which male and female citizens can participate 
in order to win a parcel of a new housing area. Besides supporting those in financial need the lottery aims to mix 
the separate tribes of Oman and thus contribute to the nation building of a modern society. In an earlier work, we 
showed that there must be severe doubts about the economic support aspect as it seems that the current lottery, 
without additional measures, fuels private land speculation, see Heim et al. (Homo Oecon 35:1–30, 2018). This article 
studies the emergent phenomenon of clan formation within the specific land-allocation system of Oman with a new 
mathematical and computational approach of agent-based modelling. This model is used to base the criticism to 
the system on scientific evidence. Both the method (clan formation exemplified as agent-based model) and find-
ings (simulated agents and real-world behaviour) advance the discussion on how to mitigate some of the negative 
effects associated with the current land allocation system. To do so, we discuss the current state and criticism around 
this aspect of urbanisation in Oman. We study the spatial mixing of the tribes and the possibility of clan formation in 
modern Omani settlements in particular Muscat Capital Area. We see emergent phenomena arising from the agent-
based model that matches real world behaviour leading to negative effects such as partial and incomplete land 
development, tribal clustering and real-estate market distortion. The agent-based model is used to discuss alternative 
scenarios under which tribal clan formation is used to generate a fairer and more complete settlement process in 
Oman to ensure the intended outcomes of Oman’s land-allocation lottery system.
Keywords: Collective decision-making, Simulations in economics, Settlement dynamics, Clan-formation, Housing in 
Oman
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Challenges of rapid urbanisation 
and land‑allocation
The rapid demographic development since the 1970s in 
Oman fuels a constant demand for housing. The particu-
larities of this process are captured by Benkari (2017) 
who collects an overview of research and literature on 
urbanisation in Oman. The concentration of economic 
and political power in Muscat Capital Area further con-
tributes to accelerated rates of urbanisation in this region 
of the Sultanate as studied by Nebel and von Richthofen 
(2016) in their four year research on ‘Urbanisation in 
Oman—trends and perspectives’. In a brief overview of 
the urbanisation process that lead to the emergence of 
Muscat Capital Area, we can see that the determining 
physical planning strategies were developed by Weidle-
plan (1991) and that these integrated the existing coastal 
oasis settlements and towns into a continuous urban 
fabric. Massive urbanisation of the northern coast of 
Oman led to deep structural transformation including 
the abandonment of traditional date farms, see Scholz 
(1982); Dutton (1999), yet the land property structure 
remained. This was of benefit for the wealthier farmers 
that now built houses for their clan in former oasis land, 
Abdelaal, (2013). With the advent of automobiles and 
an extended street-network by the 1980s, former rural 
areas were now accessible and connected forming a con-
glomeration of coastal towns (compare von Richthofen 
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(2015)). The coastal towns themselves witnessed a radical 
transition, as affluent families moved out into more lux-
urious neighbourhoods as studied by Scholz (1990) and 
more recently by Margraff and Scharendorf (2017). Von 
Richthofen and Langer (2015) have shown that urbanisa-
tion has exhausted more than 80% of the available land 
in the main districts of Muscat Capital Area. ‘Urban Sus-
tainability’ in Oman as in other Gulf countries has been 
turned into a political instrument as argued by Cum-
mings and von Richthofen (2017).
To regulate housing for a growing population and 
to manage spatial resources the Omani government 
installed a particular land-allocation process by lot-
tery in the 1980s granting every Omani citizen, first 
male and since 2003 female, the right to enter this lot-
tery and eventually receive a plot (Ministry of housing 
Oman, 2009). The lottery system has been criticised by 
Al Gharibi (2014) and Nebel and von Richthofen (2016) 
as leading to ‘unsustainable’ urban sprawl requiring car-
based mobility and high use of energy, material and spa-
tial resources. The absence of a land management system 
and taxes further aggravates the situation and encour-
ages land-grabbing and land-speculation. Since plots 
are in short demand and the list of applicants is getting 
longer, the government allocates plots in regions fur-
ther away from established economic centres. As a rule, 
applicants can only indicate preferred areas of future 
residence, based on their current place of work with no 
guarantee of actually receiving a plot there. The ministry 
of housing is careful not to reveal the dates and places 
of upcoming land-allocation areas in order to minimize 
land speculation. Applicants wait up to three years for a 
plot and are only entitled to one draw (Times of Oman: 
“Oman citizens call for greater transparency in land grant 
announcements 2015). The ministry of housing zones 
large districts of 2000 and more plots. These plots form 
a pool for the lottery system before the planning pro-
cess has been completed and any infrastructure such 
as asphalted roads or electricity has been installed as 
argued by Al Gharibi (2014). Technically, the allocated 
plot remains state property and the citizens are granted 
a right to usufruct their plot, similar to the Anglo-Saxon 
land lease. The governmental land-allocation process 
by lottery is very expensive across Oman, see Nebel 
and Salcedo (2015). The government plans the districts, 
conducts the lottery system and eventually deploys the 
facilities, road, energy, water and waste infrastructure; 
Al Shueili (2015). Fees for land-allocation to be paid by 
the applicants are minimal. In absence of land taxation, 
the government does not receive any direct economic 
returns from the allocation process as studied by von 
Richthofen and Scholz (2013). This process has been 
studied in comparison between Oman and neighboring 
Saudi Arabia by Shouman (2017) who links the hoard-
ing of land to regime survival strategies in the Gulf. In an 
earlier work, we showed that there must be severe doubts 
about the economic support aspect as it seems that the 
current lottery, without additional measures, fuels pri-
vate land speculation, see Heim et al. (2018).
The influence of tribal bonds on clan‑formation
Omanis define themselves by tribal affiliation which is 
often discernible by the family name. The Omani popula-
tion consists of 57 tribes (Miles 1919; Scholz 1990). Each 
tribe has a historic settlement area. Wilkinson (1977) 
links the Aflāj (traditional irrigation system) of Oman to 
tribal settlement patterns. He studied the system of water 
organisation that used to structure social bonds, enable 
agriculture and determine urban space. It formed a social 
and economic contract of tribes and clans in the past. 
His central argument is that a tribally organised popula-
tion running a collective irrigation system cannot emerge 
under a centralised state. Although water and agricul-
ture are not prominent aspects of modern urban life in 
Oman, the social bonds remain and we can see parallels 
of a modern Omani population with strong tribal roots 
undermining a centralised land allocation system. The 
editors Lavergne and Dumortier (2002) recollected many 
scholars on Oman [amongst them geographers Fred 
Scholz (1990) and Belgacem Mokhtar (2013)] to depict 
the modern Oman identity rooted in its imperial past, 
Ibadi culture and emerging from the Omani Renaissance 
post 1970. Their work helped to contextualise the nation 
building process of which the present land-allocation lot-
tery system is a key aspect.
The imprints of tribal settlement patterns across 
what is now Muscat Capital Area have been studied by 
(von Richthofen 2018) and form the base of the present 
urban fabric. Tribal leaders voice their opinion on eco-
nomic and political matters. The early years of mod-
ern Oman were characterized by the tribal uprising 
and civil war in Jebel Akhdar and Dhofar. (Valeri 2013) 
describes how tribal bonds continue to dictate politi-
cal and economic aspects of civil society in Oman and 
how the Sultan ‘domesticated’ the local elites by grant-
ing them ministerial positions and other privileges. 
Marriages are often arranged to forge tribal alliances, 
businesses run by clan members and official positions 
strategically placed to appease tribal tension. Not sur-
prisingly, the tribal heritage has a strong impact on the 
social life in Oman. Since home-ownership is a deci-
sive moment in every Omani’s fortune and future, it is, 
therefore, possible to think of tribal affiliations as the 
main driver for settlement decisions. Since the tribal 
affiliation is a historic construction linked to the Omani 
citizens by their name, this tribal affiliation does not 
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vanish or change with the re-settlement in new resi-
dential neighborhoods. In comparing land allocation 
and speculation in Oman to Saudi Arabia Shouman 
(2017) goes even further. He argues that “Land specu-
lation, the impact [of land-allocation processes] on the 
housing market and the citizens’ ability to afford them” 
are tightly interwoven in Oman as in Saudi Arabia; 
Shouman (2017, p 3). He further argues that so-called 
‘White Land’—undeveloped urban land that is tem-
porarily withheld from the market to increase land 
prices—is often granted to tribal leaders, see Shouman 
(2017, p 125). The following conclusion for the case 
of Oman corresponds to the motivation of the agents 
developed in our earlier study (see Heim et  al. 2018): 
“The purported main causes of White Land in Oman are 
three: 1- Omani citizens residing on or using state land 
without having a legitimate right to do so. 2- Gulf Coop-
eration Council (GCC) citizens owning a lot of land in 
Oman and not developing it. 3- Some Omani elites own-
ing White Land and not developing it.” Shouman (2017, 
p 126). Since we have demonstrated the spatial eco-
nomic consequences in our previous model it is now 
time to investigate the socio-economic drivers.
Belgacem (2011) describes how the socio-economic 
changes induced by the oil-production have impacted the 
form, function and structure of urban spaces in Oman. 
He describes a new spatial mobility of households evi-
dent in the purchasing power on building lands and 
houses. He describes “a dynamism of a parallel land 
market lets foretell a segregationist division of the inhab-
ited areas or in the currently urbanizing spaces” Belgacem 
(2011). He illustrates this idea with a ‘heat-map’ of real 
estate price-distribution for Muscat Capital Area taken 
from real estate advertisements of 2010 as an indicator of 
spatial fragmentation and polarisation. Belgacem’s weak 
source data can only offer a coarse snapshot of social and 
spatial distribution in Muscat Capital Area.
Our agent-based model helps to investigate two 
key aspects that emerge from the research literature 
on urbanisation in Oman: (A) Identifying spatial dis-
tribution in modern Muscat Capital Area related to 
tribal motivations in parallel to the historic ones as 
described by Wilkinson (1977) that undermine central 
state efforts of controlled land allocation by lottery. 
(B) Offering a mathematical model to explain the fine-
grain motivations of each agent and to demonstrate 
the emergent phenomena that are congruent with site 
observation. The spatial aggregation of members of 
a similar tribe will thus be called clan-formation. If 
Omanis in urban and rural areas choose to regroup 
their clan members by arranging plots of land in the 
vicinity of the tribe members, could the governmental 
land-allocation system by lottery really counter this 
effect? Is clan-formation an overlooked aspect and a 
hindrance to equal access to settlement resources?
In order to answer the question on the influence of 
tribal behaviour on the land-allocation process, we 
decided to expand a previous mathematical agent-
based land-allocation model developed by the authors 
(Heim et  al. 2018). This article—as the previous one 
(Heim et  al. 2018)—ignored the more complex demo-
graphic composition of Oman with multiple ethnicities 
and migrant workers and abstracts the model solely on 
the population group that is included in the state wel-
fare program, namely Omani citizens. This model con-
sisted of a finite number of agents reflecting the range 
of behavioral choices within the residential market and 
rules for the agents to either keep, develop or sell their 
properties. The lottery system is said to be ‘fair’ to all 
Omani citizens as it allocates a plot to each applicant. 
It is also said to be ‘efficient’ both in the sense that all 
applicants get a plot and that these plots are then devel-
oped rapidly by the applicants. The study concludes 
that the lottery system fuels a shadow market of land 
speculation, excluding those with low income from 
home ownership, and that plot development plateaus 
at a completion rate dependent on the level of govern-
mental infrastructure provision. Unless the government 
applies both incentives for land development and taxa-
tion for land speculation, the system cannot be said to 
be ‘fair’ nor ‘efficient’. On the contrary, neither part of 
the intended beneficiaries nor the government itself 
profits from this process. Finally, the lottery system is 
said to spatially mix applicants of different tribal groups 
and undermine clan-formation in residential neighbor-
hoods thereby creating a modern mixed Omani society, 
see Miller (1997). The present paper expands on the 
previous agent-based simulation to investigate whether 
this is actually true.
Following this study question the remainder is struc-
tured as follows: “Modelling clan-formation in resi-
dential settlements in Oman” section introduces the 
mathematical model and three scenarios that illustrate 
different ways of how conglomerations of members of 
tribes may take place: (i) swap/purchase/sale of land 
between two agents, and (ii) between three agents, and 
with regards to a steering force. In “Discussion of the 
model results” section we see that all describe scenar-
ios lead a randomized initial mixture of the involved 
clans to a situation where large to huge sub-areas are 
occupied by one and the same clan. Hence, although 
designed with the best intentions, the lottery system 
lacks in all essential parts if only moderate coordinated 
efforts are made to bring tribes together. Finally, “Con-
clusions” section gives a conclusion.
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Modelling clan‑formation in residential 
settlements in Oman
As indicated, our model is based on the agent-based cel-
lular automata studied in Heim et al. (2018). There, plots 
of land are discussed that consist of a combination of 
roads, and a combination of parcels for business houses 
and for family houses. Parcels/houses are uniquely asso-
ciated with streets. Agents (owners of parcels) can be 
classified according to 3 dimensions: their sales strategy 
(“keep” vs. “sell”), their development strategy (“built up” 
vs “don’t build up”) and the urgency to implement them 
(sell/build: “now” vs. “later”), cf. Table  1 in Heim et  al. 
(2018). Some of these agents just want to build houses 
for their families, others want to reduce building cost or 
intend to make business with selling parcels (Seller type) 
or with well-timed and available houses, whereas others, 
like Accumulators, intend to gather a number of con-
nected parcels to build larger resorts. The simulations are 
initiated by providing a certain distribution of these agent 
types that are randomly dispersed over the plot such that 
all parcels are covered.
In order to study the impact of tribal structures, we 
forgo the simulation of build-up and focus solely on the 
formation of connected settlement blocks of their own 
tribe through swapping of parcels. Each agent is assigned 
a tribe and has the goal to get a parcel in the neighbor-
hood of other members of his tribe. To measure the 
degree of this we use the tribe membership of the 24 par-
cels around the parcel (with suitable adoptions to parcels 
at or near the boundary of the plot). We implement two 
different strategies for the agents:
Strategy 1: Swapping of parcels between two agents of 
different tribes with the intention to move into a neigh-
borhood that is occupied by more members of the same 
clan i.e. the surrounding 24 parcels as discussed above. 
This strategy is purely local and does not involve any 
communication on a global level.
Strategy 2: Each clan decides to have a dedicated center, 
e.g. in our case with four tribes each chooses separate 
corners of the quadratic plot. Using swapping of par-
cels between two agents each agent tries to get closer to 
their respective tribe center. I.e., that the Euclidean dis-
tance between the center of the previous parcel and the 
center of new parcel towards the corresponding corner is 
reduced. Whereas the earlier scenario is local in the sense 
that each agent tries to maximize their neighborhood, 
this scenario considers the effects of agreements or tribal 
members that impose a somewhat binding global strat-
egy on each agent.
To understand how much effort is needed to counter 
the positive intention of the lottery to spatially mix the 
different tribes, we implemented as examples the follow-
ing two scenarios.
Scenario 1: We use agent strategy 1 and distribute four 
clans in a 1:1:1:1 ratio randomly over the plot. Moreover, 
we assumed, in favor of the spatial mixing, that the fourth 
tribe (white) does not follow the idea of forming con-
nected settlement blocks of its members and thus hin-
ders the attempts of the remaining tribes.
Scenario 2: We use agent strategy 2 and distribute five 
clans in a 1:1:1:1:1 ratio. As before the last tribe stays at 
their given parcel.
For each scenario 100 Monte Carlo runs were per-
formed in order to rule out statistical biases.1 Each simu-
lation works as follows. After the initialization phase the 
simulation runs of each scenario follow a tailored pro-
gression process:
1. For each parcel the percentage of own tribe neigh-
bors is determined
2. Run randomly over all combinations of pairs of 
agents and determine whether the situation for both 
agents is better at the new parcel (i.e. more neighbors 
of the own tribe in the new neighborhood or closer 
to the tribe center)
3. If the situation is better for all involved agents, then 
the swapping is performed (in particular in scenario 
2 there may be just two-agent interactions and parcel 
swaps where the third agent remains at their parcel)
4. Repeat these steps until there are no swaps at a phase 
(then a stationary situation is achieved).
Note that the situation may occur that—especially at 
tribe area boundaries—it may be mutually better for 
two agents to continuously swap their parcels. In these 
instances, the program terminates if only this type of 
swaps occurs.
Discussion of the model results
Let us start with scenario 1: The results of our 68th 
Monte Carlo simulation run on a 50 × 50 parcel with two 
thousand five hundred agents of this scenario are shown 
in Fig. 1. We see that in this case, the simulation termi-
nates after 11 phases towards a stationary state where no 
further exchanges/swaps of parcels take place. For this 
specific run Fig.  2 provides two illustrative statistics on 
the number of parcel swaps per phase, see Fig.  2a, and 
the number of owners/agents per amount of swap, see 
Fig. 2b. We clearly see that the stationary state is obtained 
rather fast and with not too many swaps of parcels for 
each individual agent.
1 Monte Carlo simulation is a technique used to study how a model 
responds to randomly generated inputs.
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We use the following characteristics to describe the 
result of a run:
  • the percentage of the 24 surrounding parcels belong-
ing to the same clan, averaged for all agents and on a 
per clan basis.
  • the total number of occurred swaps.
  • min/mode/median/mean/max number of swaps for 
a single agent.
The averaged characteristics overall 100 Monte Carlo 
runs are as follows, where ‘mean’ gives the arithmetical 
mean over all runs and ‘st. dev.’ its standard deviation 
as a measure of how much the values scatter about the 
mean(numbers are truncated after the third decimal):
Fig. 1 Photo of new residential neighbourhood in Muscat Capital 
Area with plot allocated by the Omani lottery in state of partial 
development. Source the authors (2016)
Fig. 2 Illustration of one simulation run for scenario 1 on a 50 × 50 grid. The numbers in brackets indicate the phase number of the simulation. In 
this two-agent interaction scenario, the simulation terminates quite nicely at a stationary state
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Total tribe 
proximity
Proximity per tribes Total number 
of swaps
Swaps per agent
Tribe 1 Tribe 2 Tribe 3 Tribe 4 Min Mode Median Mean Max
Mean 0.559 0.662 0.662 0.661 0.249 1653.7299 0.000 0.000 0.990 1.322 9.040
St. dev. 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.009 74.576 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.059 1.145
two thousand five hundred agents of this scenario are 
shown in Fig.  3. We see that in this case, the simula-
tion terminates nicely after only four phases towards 
a stationary state where no further exchanges/swaps 
of parcels take place. For this specific run Fig.  4 pro-
vides analogously to Fig.  2 two illustrative statistics 
on the number of parcel swaps per phase, see Fig.  4a, 
and the number of owners/agents per amount of swap, 
see Fig.  4b. We clearly see that the stationary state is 
obtained rather fast and with not too many swaps of 
parcels for each individual agent. Finally, the averaged 
characteristics overall 100 Monte Carlo runs are as 
follows:
Fig. 3 Statistics of the run shown in Fig. 1. a Gives the number of parcel swaps per phase, and b shows the distribution of swaps per owner 
indicating that one may expect rather few swaps per agent
These statistics clearly indicate that a good level of 
tribe proximity can be achieved by those tribes whose 
members aim for this and also that it is not really hard 
to do so. In particular, the distribution of the swaps 
per agent has positive skewness (is right-skewed). Of 
course, under the assumptions that all tribe members 
are actively engaged in a swap if necessary and that 
there are enough partners for swapping parcels.
For scenario 2: In order to occupy all four corners, 
we use five tribes: 4 mobile and one who stays at the 
initially assigned parcels. The results of our 99th 
Monte Carlo simulation run on a 50 × 50 parcel with 
Total tribe 
proximity
Proximity per tribes Total number 
of swaps
Swaps per agent
Tribe 1 Tribe 2 Tribe 3 Tribe 4 Min Mode Median Mean Max
Mean 0.645 0.756 0.757 0.756 0.755 2277.879 0.000 1.760 2.000 1.822 9.860
St. dev. 0.008 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.015 60.344 0.000 0.6537 0.000 0.048 1.005
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Fig. 4 Illustration of one simulation run for scenario 3 on a 50 × 50 grid. The numbers in brackets indicate the phase number of the simulation. In 
this two-agent interaction scenario with the goal to be close to a tribe center the simulation terminates extremely fast at a stationary state
Fig. 5 Statistics of the run shown in Fig. 3. a Gives the number of parcel swaps per phase, and (b) shows the distribution of swaps per owner 
indicating that one may expect rather few swaps per agent
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The tribe proximity of the tribe 5 which is not 
engaged in swapping is 0.199 (with a standard devia-
tion of 0.009). Again, we see that an extremely good 
level of tribe proximity can be achieved very fast and 
by means of a little bit higher flexibility of the involved 
agents in terms of the numbers of swaps they may have 
to undergo. Interestingly, the skewness now is negative 
(left-skewed) indicating again the more intensive swap-
ping actions of the individual agents compared to the 
first scenario (Fig. 5).
Certainly, scenario 2 yields as well a clear separation 
of the tribes which is even more pronounced as that 
in scenario 1. This is not surprising as this scenario is 
based on a globally optimizing strategy. Though, such 
an invisible or visible hand of the global optimizer 
may in reality soon attract the attention of officials. 
As stated by Shouman (2017, p 127) Omani officials 
are well aware of so-called ‘White Land’ and ingenious 
strategies by their citizens to stretch the original intent 
of the land-allocation process by lottery.
Conclusions
The article studies the emergent phenomenon of clan 
formation within the specific land-allocation system 
of Oman with a new mathematical and computational 
approach of agent-based modelling. The new method 
(clan formation exemplified as agent-based model) and 
findings (simulated agents and real-world behaviour) 
yield scientific discoveries that can help to mitigate some 
of the negative effects associated with the current land 
allocation system. The article does not claim to present 
the land-allocation system in Oman as an unknown prob-
lem nor does it recommend solutions, but offers a new 
view onto it through agent-based modelling that allows, 
for the first time, to quantify emergent phenomena such 
as clan formation. The mathematical model validates pre-
vious research findings of the authors and other research-
ers in the field of urbanisation in Oman (compare Scholz 
1990; Belgacem, 2011; Al Gharibi, 2014; Benkari 2017; 
Shouman 2017).
The previous agent-based model by Heim et al. (2018) 
revealed spatial-economic inequalities. This study 
extends the previous model to include socio-economic 
drivers of land-settlement such as tribal affiliation and 
clan-formation. Both scenarios developed with the 
extended agent-based model reveal that clan-formation is 
inevitable under the current system. A trade-off can be 
observed between social mix or segregation within clans 
and efficient land-allocation to clan members. Spatial 
mixing, as the process of clan-formation, is further con-
strained by the urgency of individuals to actually settle 
down, build a home and start a family (compare Scholz 
1990; Belgacem 2011; Al Gharibi 2014; Benkari 2017; 
Shouman 2017). This life-changing decision blocks the 
mobility of a plot-owner for a long time. For the model, 
this means that once the initial plots have been settled, 
there seem to be not enough matching opportunities to 
create a competitive market. Thus, the following phases 
cannot accommodate trades motivated by tribal affilia-
tion explicitly, yet also not exclude them totally. The study 
suggests that Oman is closer to the metaphorical ‘salad 
bowl’ described by Belgacem (2011) as ‘segregationist 
division’, where tribal groups might get relocated but not 
dissolved, than the ‘melting pot’. Incidentally, the land-
allocation system strengthens the tribal power on a local 
level and forms a third aspect contrary to the intended 
purposes of the land-allocation system a striking parallel 
to Wilkinson (1977) central thesis that a “tribally organ-
ised population running a collective irrigation (and spatial 
distribution) system cannot emerge under a centralised 
state” (additions by the authors). Taking limitless mobil-
ity of the clan members into account, the simulation 
tests all desired properties, which would require exces-
sive coordination between clans and individuals in real 
life. Clan-formation will thus never reach absolute states 
as described by the model, but gradually slows down, 
a further indication why the process is hard to back by 
empirical data, but is a recurring subject among younger 
Omanis that suffer from the impossibility to access the 
real-estate market. The simulation results confirm that 
emergent urban phenomena such as partial settlement, 
land speculation and spatial mobility can be linked to.
Our agent-based model helps to investigate two key 
aspects in particular: it relates spatial distribution in 
modern Muscat Capital Area to tribal motivations that 
threaten to undermine central state efforts of controlled 
land allocation by lottery and explains, for the first time, 
the fine-grain motivations of each agent and to demon-
strate the emergent phenomena that are congruent with 
site observation. In conclusion, we can say that tribal 
affiliation strongly influences the current land-allocation 
process in Oman. The model shows that clan-formation 
has (i) social, (ii) spatial, (iii) economic and (iv) political 
consequences. The original intent of the land-allocation 
by lottery (i) in support of a modern nation-building, (ii) 
sustainable allocation of spatial resources, (iii) egalitar-
ian welfare system and (iv) as consolidator of the politi-
cal status quo does not completely match. Given these 
multi-dimensional threats to the original intentions of 
the land-allocation system by lottery, reforms need to be 
adopted soon. We see the inclusion of tribal motivations 
into future governance of land-allocation as key to sus-
tainable urban development in tribal societies like Oman. 
Such a governance system would embrace tribal spatial 
mobility and affiliation, create necessary clan-clusters on 
a micro-scale of neighbourhoods while ensuring a fair 
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and even access of all citizens to urban facilities on the 
larger municipal and regional level. The present agent-
based model can be used to develop such a new govern-
ance approach.
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